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Like it or not, judges are role models in our profession.
Judges cannot ask lawyers to accept a standard of
professionalconduct to which they do not abide.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

Conspicuously absent from most of the discussion about legal
professionalism is an analysis of the need for more professionalism among the
judiciary-the lawyers who serve as judges. Speeches, articles, commissions,
* Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law-St. Louis. I thank Jane Aiken,
Kathleen Clark, Rebecca Dresser, Ron Levin, Kevin McMunigal, and Karen Tokarz for their
helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article.
1. Marvin E. Aspen, The Searchfor Renewed Civility in Litigation,28 VAL. U. L. REV. 513,
519 (1994). Marvin Aspen is a United States District Judge for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division, and he was the chair of the Civility Committee for the Seventh Federal Judicial
Circuit. Id. at 513-14 n.*. Judge Aspen's statement directly responds to the enduring truth of
Mark Twain's quote: "It's noble to be good ... and it's nobler to teach others to be good, and
less trouble." THE WIT & WISDOM OF MARK TwAIN 5 (Alex Ayres ed., 1987). John Selden, an
English jurist in the 1600s, observed the disjunction between what those in authority preach and
what they sometimes practice when he coined the phrase, "Preachers say Doe as I say, not as I
doe." TABLE TALK OF JOHN SELDEN 107 (Frederick Pollock ed., 1927).
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centers, and creeds on professionalism usually place a singular emphasis on
lawyers. Although many of the most vocal proponents for professionalism are
judges, their customary focus on lawyers' conduct misses the central need for
judges to lead any serious effort to improve professionalism by example and
not simply by words.
Bar leaders, judges, and commentators speak and write about the "crisis in
professionalism," using images of "Rambo" lawyers.2 They call for more
professionalism among lawyers as a way to improve the image of the legal
profession, restore the practice of law to a golden age (that perhaps never
existed),3 and improve the job satisfaction of lawyers and judges.4 The
bromides they usually prescribe are professionalism creeds or codes aimed at

2. See, e.g., Marvin E. Aspen, Let Us Be 'Officers of the Court,' 83 A.B.A. J., July 1997,
at 94-95 (linking a "decline of civility" among litigators and a lack of public confidence in the
legal profession as aspects of the "professionalism crisis"); Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know
Thyself: A Review ofEmpiricalResearch on Attorney Attributes Bearingon Professionalism,
46 AM. U. L. REv. 1337, 1421 (1997) (identifying "unprofessional, discourteous, and uncivil
behavior, blatant lawyer advertising, deprofessionalism of the law, and materialism" as some
"[o]utward signs of the professionalism crisis"); Eugene R. Gaetke, LitigatingZealously Within
theBounds ofthe Law-Foreword: Renewed Introspectionandthe Legal Profession,87KY.L.J.
903, 910 (1998) (noting that three aspects of the professionalism crisis are "the public is
dissatisfied with lawyers, lawyers are dissatisfied with other lawyers, and many lawyers are
dissatisfied being lawyers"); Byron C. Keeling, A Prescriptionfor Healing the Crisis in
Professionalism:Shifting the Burden of EnforcingProfessionalStandardsof Conduct, 25 TEX.
TECH. L. REv. 31, 61-73 (1993) (calling for a shift from judicial sanctions and civil suits to
lawyer disciplinary proceedings as "[t]he first step in healing the 'Crisis in Professionalism"');
David Luban & Michael Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark Times, 9 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHics 31, 31 (1995) (discussing "how to teach legal ethics during the legal
profession's self-perceived crisis of professionalism"); Justice Hugh Maddox, Lawyers: The
Aristocracy ofDemocracy or "Skunks, Snakes, and Sharks"?, 29 CUMB. L. REv. 323, 340-42
(1999) (advocating the Alabama State Lawyer's Creed as a way to eliminate "Rambo" tactics).
3. See Peter A. Joy, What We Talk About When We TalkAbout Professionalism:A Review
of Lawyers' Ideals/Lawyers' Practices: Transformations in the Legal Profession, 7 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHics 987 (1994). Professor Joy has commented:
Most [articles about professionalism] are devoid of any accurate sense of
history of the legal profession, and a majority opine that things were better
in the "good old days"--a time described by critics and even some
supporters of the professionalism movement as "mythical," "not always
that good," or perhaps a time that never was.
Id. at 989-90. Professor Deborah Rhode has observed:
Lawyers belong to a profession permanently in decline. Or so it appears
from the chronic laments by critics within and outside the bar.... If ever
there was a true fall from grace, then it must have occurred quite early in
the profession's history. Over two thousand years ago, Seneca observed
attorneys acting as accessories to injustice, "smothered by their prosperity,"
and Plato condemned lawyers' "small and unrighteous" souls.
Deborah L. Rhode, 1997 W. M. Keck FoundationForumon the Teaching ofLegal Ethics: The
ProfessionalismProblem, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 283, 283-84 (1998).
4. "Life for lawyers and judges would be smoother, more pleasant, because they would be
less fractitious in their dealings with one another." Amy R. Mashburn, Professionalismas Class
Ideology: Civility Codes andBarHierarchy,28 VAL. U. L. REV. 657, 681 (1994).
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lawyers' relationships and obligations to clients, opposing parties and their
counsel, courts and other tribunals, the public, and the justice system. Rarely
do these creeds or codes discuss judges' conduct or their duties to parties and

their counsel, witnesses, court personnel, other judges, the public, and the
justice system.6
The ever-growing body of work on legal professionalism makes it clear
that there is no single, universally accepted definition of professionalism.7 Most

5. See, e.g., Creeds of Professionalism reprinted in LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROF'L
CONDUCT §§ 01:401-01:403 (1988) [hereinafter Creeds of Professionalism] (listing different
professionalism creeds or codes for lawyers with respect to their relationships with their clients,
opposing parties and their counsel, and to the courts and other tribunals).
6. The report of the Committee on Civility of the Seventh Federal Judicial Circuit is a
noteworthy exception. See Interim Report of the Committee on Civility of the Seventh Federal
Judicial Circuit, 143 F.R.D. 371 (1991) [hereinafter Interim Civility Report of the Seventh
Circuit]; Final Report of the Committee on Civility of the Seventh Federal Judicial Circuit, 143
F.R.D. 441 (1992) [hereinafter Final Civility Report of the Seventh Circuit].
7. After systematically reviewing over seven hundred articles and speeches of prominent
bar members on the subject ofprofessionalism from the 1920s through 1960, Professor Rayman
Solomon concluded that "professionalismhas no commonly accepted definition." Rayman L.
Solomon, Five CrisesorOne: The Concept ofLegal Professionalism,1925-1960, in LAWYERS'
IDEALs/LAWYERS' PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS INTHEAMERICANLEGAL PROFESSION 144,145
(Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES]. The
American Bar Association (ABA) Commission on Professionalism (known as the Stanley
Commission) examined legal professionalism from 1960 through 1985, and the Stanley
Commission concluded, "'Professionalism' is an elastic concept the meaning and application of
which are hard to pin down." REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONALISM TO THE BOARD
OF GOvERNORS AND THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, reprinted

in 112 F.R.D. 243, 261 (1986) [hereinafter STANLEY REPORT]. Following the cue of the Stanley
Commission, some commentators state that the professionalism debate is a "moving target,"
Timothy P. Terrell & James H. Wildman, Rethinking"Professionalism,"41 EMORY L.J. 403,408
(1992), or professionalism is "like pornography, hard to define, but easy to recognize." Editorial,
Professional Responsibility: Has the Rise of Megafirms Endangered Professionalism?,75
A.B.A. J., Dec. 1989, at 38.
Others explain that the inability to define professionalism arises from the difficulty "to give
precision to a social or occupational role that varies as a function of the setting within which it
is performed, that is itself evolving, and that is perceived differently by different segments of
society." EDGAR H. SCHEIN & DIANE W. KOMMERS, PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION 8 (1972).
Professors Robert Nelson and David Trubek follow this sociological approach, and they define
professionalism as "the set of norms, traditions, and practices that lawyers have constructed to
establish and maintain their identities as professionals and their jurisdiction over legal work."
RobertL. Nelson & David M. Trubek, NewProblems and New Paradigmsin Studies oftheLegal
Profession,in LAWYERS' IDEALs/LAWYERS' PRACTICES,supra, at 5. Nelson and Trubek continue
that "professionalism should not be seen as a unitary or fixed set of values, but rather as an
ongoing process that defines the normative orientation of lawyers." Id. at 26.
Although there is little agreement about the definition of professionalism, the Stanley
Commission did agree with Roscoe Pound's definition that a profession is a group "pursuing a
learned art as a common calling in the spirit of public service-no less a public service because
it may incidentally be a means of livelihood." STANLEY REPORT, supra, at 261 (quoting ROSCOE
POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 5 (1953)). In addition to Pound's
definition ofaprofession, the Stanley Commission adopted Commission memberProfessorEliot
Freidson's definition of a profession as:
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commentators concerned about professionalism call for more civility, greater
adherence to both the spirit and letter of ethical rules, and less
commercialization of legal practice! These spheres-civility, ethics, and anticommercialization-are the three dimensions of the professionalism debate.9
Judges play a role in two of these spheres-civility and ethics. Therefore, this
Article will focus on judicial civility and ethics and will not discuss the anticommercialization dimension of the professionalism debate.'"

An occupation whose members have special privileges, such as exclusive
licensing, that are justified by the following assumptions:
1. That its practice requires substantial intellectual training and the use
of complex judgments.
2. That since clients cannot adequately evaluate the quality of the
service, they must trust those they consult.
3. That the client's trust presupposes that the practitioner's self-interest
is overbalanced by devotion to serving both the client's interest and
the public good, and
4. That the occupation is self-regulating-that is, organized in such a
way as to assure the public and the courts that its members are
competent, do not violate their client's trust, and transcend their own
self-interest.
STANLEY REPORT, supra,at 261-62.
8. Some commentators note that the focus of the bench and bar on the decline in
professional behavior is narrow and perhaps even escapist in that the professionalism debate
usually focuses on the concerns of members of the legal profession and not on the concerns of
clients and the general public. Such critiques emphasize that the most pressing issues facing the
legal profession include the need for better enforcement of existing ethical standards, fewer
delays in litigation, and ensuring the availability of affordable legal services for all the poor,
working class, and middle class persons presently priced out ofgaining access to the courts. See,
e.g., Joy, supranote 3, at 1004-09 (contending that lawyer professionalism should be examined
"in the context of what it means to clients and the public"); Mashburn, supranote 4, at 680-83
(noting that although the general public sees the provision of legal services to all as a clear
priority, the legal profession's response has been inadequate to this perceived need).
9. Quite often commentators divide ethics into some of its constituent parts-such as
competence, independence, duties to the justice system, and pro bono service-and therefore
identify several attributes of legal professionalism. See, e.g., Frank X. Neuner, Jr.,
Professionalism: Chartinga Different Coursefor the New Millennium, 73 TUL. L. REV. 2041,
2042 (1999) (stating that ethics, competence and independence, continuous learning, civility,
duties to the judicial system, and pro bono service are all elements of professionalism); Jerome
J. Shestack, Taking ProfessionalismSeriously,A.B.A. J., Aug. 1998, at 70 (stressing six criteria
ofprofessionalism: "ethics and integrity, competence combined with independence, meaningful
continuing learning, civility, delegations to thejustice system, and pro bono service"). However,
these efforts still conform to the notion that almost all of what we talk about when we talk about
professionalism falls underthebroader categories of'civility, ethics, and anti-commercialization.
10. Anti-commercialization rhetoric is a constant theme in the more than seven hundred
articles and speeches by prominent members of the bar on the subject of professionalism from
1925 to 1969. See Solomon, supra note 7, at 152. The Stanley Commission looked at the period
of 1960 to 1985, and again economic pressures on lawyers and the commercialization of the
practice of law were identified as threats to professionalism. See STANLEY REPORT, supra note
7, at 254-61. In fact, the tension of commercialization versus professionalism was the starting
point for the Commission's charge to "examine such matters as advertising and other forms of
solicitation, fee structures, so-called commercialization, competence, and the duty of the lawyer
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This Article proposes to expand the professionalism debate to include an
explicit acknowledgment that no progress will be made in improving lawyer
professionalism until there is a concerted effort to improve the professionalism
ofjudges. This Article also suggests a few concrete steps the judiciary can take
in both the civility and ethics dimensions to improve judicial professionalism,
thereby improving the professionalism of the legal profession as a whole. Part
I of this Article examines the most prominent professionalism issues and how
these issues involve the judiciary. The analysis in Part II demonstrates that the
lack of professionalism among judges is as problematic as the lack of
professionalism among lawyers. In Part III, this Article then explores the
genesis of the current professionalism movement and evaluates the few current
attempts to address judicial professionalism. Part IV concludes the Article by
outlining two proposals for judges to lead the professionalism movement by
example. The first proposal calls for better monitoring of judges'
professionalism through the use of judicial performance evaluations. The
second proposal recommends new, more specific recusal standards as one way
of demonstrating judicial allegiance to meaningful ethical rules required by a
heightened commitment to professionalism.
II. THE (UN)PROFESSIONALISM OF SOME JUDGES
Concern over public dissatisfaction with the legal profession is often cited
as a principal reason to improve professionalism." The professionalism

to his or her client and to the courts before whom the lawyer practices." Id. at 248. Early in its
report, the Commission asked, "Has our profession abandoned principle for profit,
professionalism for commercialism?" Id. at 251. Yet, the Commission did not fully examine the
implications of business values dominating the practice of law, such as the pressures for higher
billable hours, larger partnership shares and associate salaries, and a lesser commitment to pro
bono work. Additionally, the Commission never looked at these issues from the perspectives of
either clients or the general public.
Professor Dennis Curtis has examined some of these issues through research into the
attitudes of law partners and associates. Professor Curtis found that "the economics of firm
practice create a focus on the 'bottom line' leading to relaxation of ethical standards,
requirements for increased billable hours, erosion ofloyalty toward both associates and partners,
impersonal workplace relationships, and a reduction of the time and effort that was once devoted
to training associates to be competent lawyers." Dennis Curtis, Can Law Schools and Big Law
FirmsBe Friends?,74 S. CAL. L. REV. 65, 69 (2000).
It is beyond the scope of this Article to examine these and other matters of the
commercialization dimension of the professionalism debate, except to note that
commercialization primarily affects lawyers and not judges.
1I. See, e.g., STANLEY REPORT, supranote 7, at 253-54 (detailing the public's unhappiness
with lawyers); Daicoff, supra note 2, at 1340-46 (discussing the decline in public opinion and
the bar's corresponding concern over professionalism); Tom R. Tyler, Citizen Discontentwith
Legal Procedures: A SocialScience Perspectiveon Civil ProcedureReform, 45 AM. J. COMp.
L. 871, 872 (1997) (discussing surveys demonstrating public dissatisfaction with lawyers,
judges, and the justice system and stating "there is evidence of a public 'crisis of confidence' in
the legal system").
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movement focuses on instances of lawyers behaving uncivilly or unethically
as concrete examples of unprofessionalism. Although most of the attention is
directed at lawyers, public dissatisfaction with judges and instances of uncivil
or unethical judicial behavior are equally disturbing.
A. Public Opinion of Judges and JudicialIntegrity
In 1999, a national survey by the National Center for State Courts found
that public trust and confidence in state courts lagged behind confidence ratings
of other institutions, "including state governors and legislatures, police and the
U.S. Supreme Court."'" The survey also found that 81% of respondents
believed "politics influence judges in their decisions," 80% believed "wealthy
persons receive better treatment from the courts than do others," and nearly
50% believed "minorities and persons who do not speak English receive worse
treatment from the courts.' 3
Similarly, separate surveys of fifteen state court systems demonstrate
generally low confidence ratings. Among the separate surveys, only six to
forty-two percent of the public have "a great deal of confidence" or are
"extremely or very confident" in the courts, and as many as seventy-six percent
t4
responded that they are "slightly or not at all confident" in their state courts.
Unfortunately, the surveys do not detail reasons for the lack of confidence in
the courts beyond the general belief that those with wealth or political power
or those who are in the racial majority receive better treatment from the courts.
Political contributions to judges in the forty-two states in which judges are
elected also fuel public concerns about the integrity of the judiciary.'" The

12. James Podgers, Confidence Game: Bench, Bar Leaders PonderStrategies to Raise
Public Trust in the Courts, A.B.A. J., July 1999, at 86, 86. The national survey was based on
1,826 interviews conducted between January 13 and February 15, 1999. "The sample was
weighted so the three groups were represented in the same proportion as in American
society-12 percent black, 13 percent Hispanic, and 72 percent whites and others." Richard
Carelli, Survey Sees Racial Divide in Citizens' Opinion of Courts, BOSTON GLOBE, May 15,
1999, at A9. According to the survey, only 23% of respondents said they trusted their local
courts "a great deal" compared to 43% who trusted the local police and 46% who trusted the
medical profession. Daniel C. Vock, Courts Rank Low with Public,Survey Finds, CHI. DAILY
LAW BULL., Aug. 18, 2000, at 1.
13. Podgers, supra note 12, at 86.
14. Herbert M. Kritzer & John Voelker, FamiliarityBreeds Respect: How Wisconsin
Citizens View Their Courts,Summary ofState-Level CourtEvaluationSurveys, 82 JUDICATURE
58 (Sept./Oct. 1998), available at http:llwww.polisci.wisc.edu/-kritzer/research/courteval/
judicature.html.
15. Forty-two states elect some or all of their judges. See A.B.A., REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAWYERS'
CONTRIBUTIONSTOJUDGESANDJUDICIALCANDIDATES, PartTwo,

POLITICAL

CONTRIBUTIONS,

7 (1998). Seventeen states have
retention elections for judges at some level-Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, New York, Oklahoma, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Utah, and Wyoming. Id. at 5 n.4. Three states elect judges in contestable, partisan
elections and then utilize retention elections-Illinois, New Mexico, and Pennsylvania. Id.
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ABA House of Delegates created a special Task Force on Lawyers' Political

Contributions due to concerns aboutjudicial "independence, the integrity of the
courts, and the public's trust in the judicial process" arising from lawyers and

parties appearing before judges whom they support with substantial political
contributions.' The ABA Task Force Report noted concerns about both the
"appearance and, to the extent they may exist, realities of potential
impropriety."' 7 Although the legislative and executive branches also depend on
campaign contributions, judicial contributions are more problematic because
judges, unlike other elected officials, are required to be impartial and not to
represent the interests of any particular groups or political parties.
Empirical evidence demonstrates public concern over the appearance of
judicial impropriety arising out of political contributions to judges. In
Louisiana, where judges are elected, 91% of those surveyed in a public opinion
poll commissioned by the Louisiana Supreme Court agreed that "people with
political connections are treated differently"-that is, more favorably.' In the
same survey, 82% said "poor and wealthy are not treated alike," 80% stated
that "judges are too influenced by politics," and 59% said that "whites and
minorities are not treated alike."' 9 In a similar national survey sponsored by the
Seventeen states have contestable, non-partisan elections for judges at some level-Arizona,
California, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana,
Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Washington, and Wisconsin. Id. at
6 & n.8. Two states, Michigan and Ohio, select judicial candidates in party primaries or
conventions, and the judges usually run as partisans but appear on a non-partisan ballot. Id.
Finally, fourteen states use contestable, partisan elections for judges at some level-Alabama,
Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, New Mexico, New York, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia. Id. at 7 n.9. Studies from the
American Judicature Society and the National Center for State Courts indicate:
Of the nation's 1,243 state appellatejudges, 81.9% stand for election
of some type and 47.9% face contestable elections: 423 (34%) face
retention-only, 174 (14%) face contestable non-partisan elections, and 421
(33.9%) face contestable partisan elections.
Of the nation's 8,489 state judges in trial courts of general
jurisdiction, 86.9% stand for election of some type and 77.3% face
contestable elections: 818 (9.6%) face retention-only, 2,891(34.1%) face
contestable non-partisan elections and 3,669 (43.2%) face contestable
partisan elections.
Id. at 3 n.l (citing studies from the American Judicature Society and the National Center for
State Courts).
16. Id. at 3-4.
17. Id. at 4.
18. UNIv. OF NEW ORLEANS SURVEY RESEARCH CTR., CITIZEN EVALUATION OF THE
LOUISIANA COURTS: A REPORT TO THE LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT, VOLUME 1, THE SuRvEY
(June 16, 1998) at http://www.uno.edu/-poli/suprem98.htm. The Survey Center surveyed a
random sample of Louisiana adults, and the "survey yielded 1208 respondents, 43% (515) of
whom had some experience with the Louisiana court system in the past five years.... The final
cross-sectional sample consisted of 52% females and 28% blacks with 24% in the median, 35-44,
age category. These 1208 respondents are the basis for conclusions reached concerning the
'general public' or the 'cross-section."' Id.
19. Id. at 11-20.
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National Center for State Courts, "75% of those polled agreed that elected
judges are influenced by having to raise campaign funds."20 The Louisiana and
national surveys demonstrate the public's concern that elected judges consider
and favor the interests of their campaign contributors when deciding cases.
Empirical evidence also supports the possibility of impermissible
influences on elected judges. A recent survey supervised by the Texas Supreme
Court and State Bar found that nearly half of the state's judges responding
agreed that campaign contributions have a "fairly" or "very" significant
influence on courtroom decisions." In addition, 79% of the lawyers and 69%
of the court personnel participating in the Texas survey said that campaign
contributions influence judges' decisions. 22
The escalating costs ofjudicial elections have led some to charge that large
contributors, such as chambers of commerce or plaintiffs' lawyers, are "buying
justice."' In a report entitled "Payola Justice," Texans for Public Justice, a
citizen's group, contended that the largest contributors to successful judicial
candidates receive more favorable treatment from the courts because campaign
contributions influence judges' decisions.24 The citizen's group reached this
conclusion after analyzing the Texas Supreme Court's decisions and correlating
the decisions with the largest contributors' interests in the judicial campaigns.
Of course, this type of analysis does not say anything about the underlying
relative merits of the parties' positions. Yet, in 1987, when plaintiffs' lawyers
made most of the contributions to justices, the Texas Supreme Court ruled in
favor of plaintiffs in 67% of the cases.2" In 1998, when businesses, insurance
companies, and doctors made most of the contributions to justices, defendants

20. Tony Mauro, JudgesShouldn't Have to Please Voters, USA TODAY, Oct. 18,2000, at
17A. See also supranote 12.
21. State Bar ofTex. &Tex. Office of Court Admin., The Courts and the LegalProfession
in Texas-The Insider'sPerspective: A Survey of Judges, CourtPersonnel,and Attorneys at
http:llwww.courts.state.tx.us/publicinfo/index.htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2001). Written
"questionnaires were mailed to samples of2,127 Texas judges, 2,198 court personnel, and 2,487
Texas attorneys in the fall of 1998. The response rates for the surveys were: 51 percent for
Texas judges; 43 percent for Texas court personnel; and, 42 percent for Texas attorneys." Id.
22. See id. at 5.
23. See, e.g., Doug Bandow, Buying Justice: Plaintiffs'LawyersReap Huge Dividendsby
Investing in Judgesand Politicians,KNIGHT RIDDER/TRIB., Dec. 16, 1999 (discussing affect of
campaign contributions onjudges decisionmaking); Editorial, Campaign ContributionsCorrupt
JudicialRaces, USA TODAY, Sept. 1,2000, at 16A ("[S]pecial interests are dying to buyjudicial
seats for their favored philosophy.").
24. See Texans for Public Justice, Payola Justice: How Texas Supreme Court Justices
RaiseMoneyfrom CourtLitigants,at http://www.tpj.org/reports/payola/toc.html (last visited Jan.
29,2001).
25. See 60 Minutes: Justicefor Sale: Whether There's a Connection Between Campaign
Contributionsto Texas Supreme Court Justices and the Outcomes of Cases (CBS television
broadcast, Nov. 1, 1998).
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won 69% of the cases, 26 and insurance companies won approximately 90% of
the time.

27

1. The Inadequacy ofExistingJudicialDisqualificationStandards
Except for an Alabama law,2 Sjudicial ethics rules and legal standards in the
United States do not clearly require elected judges to recuse or disqualify
themselves from hearing matters when major contributors to their election
campaigns appear as parties or lawyers.29
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. In an effort to address the appearance of impropriety ofjudges presiding over cases
involving campaign contribut-rs, Alabama adopted legislation, effective in 1996, granting
parties the right to require recusal when the judges or justices assigned to their cases have
received significant campaign contributions from the opposing parties or their lawyers. See Ex
parte Kenneth D. McLeod, Sr., Family Ltd. P'ship XV, 725 So. 2d 271, 274 (Ala. 1998)
(commenting on the reasons for the new recusal statute). The Alabama law provides, in pertinent
part:
If the action is assigned to ajustice orjudge of an appellate court who has
received more than four thousand dollars ($4,000) based on the information
set forth in any one certificate of disclosure, or to a circuit judge who has
received more than two thousand dollars ($2,000)... then, within 14 days
after all parties have filed a certificate of disclosure, any party who has
filed a certificate of disclosure setting out an amount.., below the limit
applicable to the justice or judge, or an amount above the applicable limit
but less than that of any opposing party, shall file a written notice requiring
recusal of the justice or judge or else such party shall be deemed to have
waived such right to a recusal.
ALA. CODE § 12-24-2(c) (Supp. 2000). The section of the Alabama law on the legislative intent
of this statute states:
The Legislature intends by this chapter to require the recusal of a
justice or judge from hearing a case in which there may be an appearance
of impropriety because as a candidate the justice or judge received a
substantial contribution from a party to the case, including attorneys for the
party ....

This legislation in no way intends to suggest that any sitting

justice or judge of this state would be less than fair and impartial in any
case.
ALA. CODE § 12-24-1 (Supp. 2000).

Although the express intent of the Alabama legislation is to remove the appearance of
impropriety through a recusal process, the fact that a lawyer must request recusal still places the
lawyer in the uncomfortable position of suggesting that the justice or judge may not be fair or
impartial. This burden on the lawyer may be too great because the lawyer may fear reprisals from
the samejustice orjudge in future matters in which the lawyer will not be able to require recusal.
A better solution is automatic recusal whenever ajustice or judge presides over a case involving
a major contributor. See infra notes 139-47 and accompanying text.
29. There are only two instances when a party has an enforceable constitutional right to
an impartial judge. In the first instance, the judge or decision maker has a direct, pecuniary
interest in the outcome of the matter. See, e.g, Ward v. Vill. of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60
(1972); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 522-23 (1927). In the second, the judge has been the
target of criticism or some form ofabuse by a party appearing before the judge. See, e.g., Taylor
v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488,501-03 (1974); Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455,465-66 (1971).
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Appellate and state supreme courts rarely require trial judges or appellate
judges to step down when contributors appear before them, even though most
commentators argue that existing judicial ethics rules which require a fair and
impartial judge should lead to recusal.3" Attempts to disqualify judges have
failed, for example, when a single lawyer donated 21% of the campaign funds
to ajudge presiding over a case, 31 a lawyer donated $10,000 to a trial judge's
re-election campaign a few days after the judge received a case assignment
involving the lawyer,32 and a lawyer handling a case before a state supreme
court donated $248,000 to the justices hearing his case.33
2. Efforts to Reform JudicialSelection Processes
Professor Roy Schotland identifies the "increasing politicization ofjudicial
elections" as the "greatest current threat to judicial independence. 3 4 He notes
that after nearly one hundred years of efforts to eliminate judicial elections, the
vast majority of state court judges continue to face elections of some type.3"
Campaigns are increasingly expensive, and quite often judicial candidates run
on such strong anti-crime campaigns that the candidates' campaign statements
raise questions
about their ability, if elected, to preside fairly over criminal
36
cases.

Three United States Supreme Court Justices have noted that elected judges
who apply the law fairly to criminal defendants-especially in capital
30. "Indeed, the scholarly opinion isjust as unanimous that a campaign contribution should
require a judge to recuse as the courts are agreed that recusal is unnecessary." John Copeland
Nagle, The Recusallternativeto CampaignFinanceLegislation,37 HARV. J. ONLEGIs. 69, 88
(2000) (citing several authors who argue that existing ethical rules require elected judges to
recuse themselves). Courts typically reason that it would be "impractical" to require ajudge to
recuse herself from cases involving contributors, or the courts "deny that a reasonable observer
would view ajudge as biased when deciding a case involving a campaign contributor." Id.; see
also Breakstone v. MacKenzie, 561 So. 2d 1164, 1168 n.6 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (listing
articles criticizing decisions permitting judges to preside over cases involving campaign
contributors); Stuart Banner, Note, Disqualifying Elected Judges from Cases Involving
Campaign Contributors,40 STAN. L. REV. 449,483-89 (1988) (reviewing current ethical rules
and advocating clearer ethical rules to require disqualification of judges in cases involving
significant campaign contributors).
31. See River Rd. Neighborhood Ass'n v. S. Tex. Sports, Inc., 673 S.W.2d 952, 952 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1984) (en bane).
32. Two days after Judge Anthony Farris was assigned to hear the case of Texaco v.
Pennzoil, Joe Jamail, Pennzoil's lead counsel at the time, donated $I0,000 to Judge Farris' reelection campaign and another $10,000 to the campaign of the administrative judge with
supervisory powers over Judge Farris. Jamail's contributions to seventeen other judges during
this same time totaled less than $13,000. See THOMAS PETZINGER, JR., OIL & HONOR: THE
TEXACO-PENNZOIL WARS 282-88 (1987). Texaco's motion to recuse Judge Farris on the basis
of the contribution was denied. See id.
at 290-91.
33. See Richard Woodbury, Is Texas JusticeforSale?, TIME, Jan. 11, 1988, at 74, 74.
34. Roy A. Schotland, Comment, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 149, 149 (1998).
35. See id.
at 149-50.
36. See id.
at 150.
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cases-face the danger of losing their next election. 37 Justice John Paul Stevens

observed that the danger of judges bending to public pressure in capital cases
also may extend to appointedjudges who contemplate a higherjudicial office.3a
Calling the present state ofjudicial elections a national problem, supreme
court justices from the seventeen largest states with judicial elections met
recently with legislators and academicians to explore proposals to reform the
judicial election system. The meeting, sponsored by the National Center for

37. See Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 519 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that
elected judges "must constantly profess their fealty to the death penalty"); Wainwright v. Witt,
469 U.S. 412, 459 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (observing that there is an acute risk of
judicial bias in capital cases where community pressure on elected judges to convict those
accused of a capital crime "can overwhelm even those of good conscience"); Ruth Marcus,
Justice White CriticizesJudicialElections, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 1987, at A5 ("If a judge's
ruling for the defendant ... may determine his fate at the next election, even though his ruling
was affirmed and is unquestionably right, constitutional protections would be subject to serious
erosion." (quoting Justice Byron R. White)).
The influence of public opinion on elected judges' use of discretion is best demonstrated
by a study of the four states where judges can override ajury's sentence in death penalty cases.
Professors Stephen Bright and Patrick Kennan found that in the three states-Alabama, Florida,
and Indiana-where judges face elections, judges overrode jury sentences of life imprisonment
and imposed the death penalty in at least three times as many cases as when the judges overrode
jury sentences of the death penalty to impose sentences of life imprisonment. See Stephen B.
Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding Between the Bill of
Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REv. 759, 793 (1995). In one
state-Delaware-where state judges are not elected,judges overrode thejury recommendation
of the death penalty and imposed life sentences in every case they considered. Id. at 794.
38. Justice Stevens observed:
The "higher authority" to whom present-day capital judges may be "too
responsive" is a political climate in which judges who covet higher
office-or who merely wish to remain judges-must constantly profess
their fealty to the death penalty .... The danger that they will bend to
political pressure when pronouncing sentence in highly publicized capital
cases is the same danger confronted by judges beholden to King George
III.
Harris,513 U.S. at 519-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
The successful effort to block Missouri Supreme Court Justice Ronnie White's nomination
to the federal bench appears to confirm Justice Stevens's belief that judges who fail to be guided
by public opinion in capital cases will notbe able to advance their careers. Senator John Ashcroft
from Missouri accused Judge White of being "soft on the death penalty" even though Judge
White voted to uphold death sentences in seventy percent of the appeals he heard. Mary
McGrory, Scandalous Symmetry, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 2001, at B5. In his testimony at the
Senate confirmation hearing for Ashcroft as U.S. Attorney General, Judge White said Ashcroft
had distorted the record by labeling Judge White as "pro-criminal" for writing a dissent in a case
urging retrial of a man sentenced to death because the man had inadequate counsel. See Susan
Milligan, Judge Says Ashcrofl "Distorted"Record Despite Testimony, He is Expected to be
Confirmed,BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 19,2001, at A29. Ashcroftjustified his opposition to White by
stating that "incompetent counsel was not enough of a reason to order a new trial in such a
gruesome case." Id.
39. See Dennis Chaptman, ProcessofElection Judges Debated,MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL,
Dec. 10, 2000, at 2B. Critics ofjudicial elections feared the meeting would result in "a strategy
for defense of the system rather than an effort to find solutions." William Glaberson, Chief
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State Courts, started with the premise that the election ofjudges will remain a
reality for the foreseeable future.' After shelving discussion of merit selection
ofJudges, the participants considered the following judicial campaign reforms:
educating voters through candidate forums and printed voter guides,
lengthening judicial terms of office, moving toward nonpartisan elections, and
public financing of judicial campaigns.4' The reform proposals will be
presented to the Conference of Chief Justices in early 2001.42
However, it is doubtful that judicial campaign election reforms alone will
be effective to restore confidence and improve the image of elected judges and
the courts. 3 Even whenjudicial candidates agree upon spending limits, interest
groups are able to set up special committees to run issue campaigns that harm
one candidate and benefit another. For example, the Ohio Chamber of
Commerce recently tried to unseat an Ohio Supreme Court justice whom the
Chamber criticized for not voting "in favor of business."44 The Chamber set up

Justices to Meet on Abuses in JudicialRaces, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2000, at A14 (quoting Tom
Smith).
40. See Tony Mauro, Growing Concerns OverJudicialElections,LEGAL TIMEs, Nov. 27,
2000, at 18. Professor Roy Schotland, the main organizer of the summit, stated that because
many attending the meeting support judicial elections, the summit would not "'put energy into
that debate anymore."' Id.
41. Id.
42. See Diana Strzalka, Leaders at Conference Callfor HigherStandards in Judicial
Elections, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 10, 2000, at C3.
43. Commentators have focused on the effects ofcampaign contributions on elected judges
and the effects of mobilization of public opinion around issues, such as crime, on judicial
campaigns. These extralegal influences onjudges threaten the guarantee that judges will be fair
and neutral decisionmakers, and the commentators offer a number of solutions to minimize the
effect of these influences on judges. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Some Realism about
Electoralism: Rethinking JudicialCampaignFinance,72 S.CAL. L. REV.505 (1999) (analyzing
judicial campaign reform recommendations and questioning the assumption that some form of
electoral selection of state court judges is evitable); Paul D. Carrington, JudicialIndependence
and DemocraticAccountabilityin HighestState Courts, 61 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 79, 118-25
(1998) (recommending some form of appointive system for selecting judges and exploring a
number of judicial campaign reforms, including judicial campaign spending limits, limits on
judicial campaign tactics, and public financing of judicial campaigns); Roy A. Schotland,
Elective Judges' Campaign Financing: Are State Judges' Robes the Emperor's Clothes of
American Democracy?, 2 J.L. & POL. 57, 121-32 (1985) (advocating the study of ways to
improvejudicial campaign financing, and recommending efforts such as better voter education,
conditioning bar endorsements on agreed solicitation and campaign contribution limits, more
effective campaign contribution disclosure laws, and voluntary judicial campaign spending
limits); Banner, supra note 30 (advocating clearer ethical rules to require disqualification of
judges in cases involving significant campaign contributors); Mark Andrew Grannis, Note,
Safeguardingthe Litigant'sConstitutionalRight to a FairandImpartialForum: A DueProcess
Approach to ImproprietiesArisingfrom JudicialCampaign Contributionsfrom Lawyers, 86
MicH. L. REV. 382, 406-18 (1987) (arguing for better regulation of judicial campaign
contributions and better recusal standards in cases involving judicial campaign contributors).
44. Constance Sommer, Ohio Supreme Court Race Gets Political: "4 Very Bad
Campaign," CoRP. LEGAL TIMES, May 2000, at 72 (according to a Chamber of Commerce
analysis of court decisions, Ohio Supreme Court Justice Alice Robie Resnick was "only voting
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a special committee to evade the candidates' agreed upon spending limits of

$500,000, and launched a three million dollar "issue" advertisement
campaign.' One advertisement ran the banner "Is justice for sale in Ohio?"
beneath the name of the justice the Chamber wanted to replace.' The Ohio
Elections Commission dismissed a complaint that the advertisement was unfair
and undermined the justice system.47
Based on the Ohio experience and the inability to craft effective and

constitutionally sound judicial campaign funding controls, one chief justice
recently stated that "' [t]here is a consensus among the chiefs of supreme courts
that the only way to diminish the large amounts of contributions is to go to
some sort of appointed system."' 48 Yet, even a judicial appointment system
may be insufficient.49 In the court cases surrounding the 2000 presidential
election, criticism of the majority decisions by the Florida Supreme Court,
because the justices were merit-selected by Democrats, and of the majority
decisions by the United States Supreme Court, because the Justices were meritselected by Republicans, may indicate that any selection process involving
partisan appointments will fail to insulate judges from criticism about their
integrity and independence."0
in favor of business 18 percent of the time").
45. See James Bradshaw, O'DonnellLaments Secret Ads, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 24,

2000, at BI.
46. Id. Another advertisement praised the candidate the Chamber of Commerce supported.
Id.
47. See T.C. Brown & Sandy Theis, TV Ads Saying "Is Justicefor Sale?" Can Stay,
Commission Rules, THE PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 21, 2000, at 5B. Lawyers for the group running the
advertisement successfully argued that "if words like 'elect,' 'defeat' or 'vote for' are not used,
the ad represents constitutionally protected free speech." Id.
48. Rob Modic, Judge Selection ProcessFocus of Conference, Cox NEWS SERVICE, Dec.
9, 2000, LEXIS, Nexis Library (quoting Ohio's Chief Justice Thomas Moyer).
49. Although most commentators agree that merit selection plans are better than the
judicial elections at guaranteeing judicial independence, politics still play a role in most merit
selection plans. See, e.g., Karen L. Tokarz, Women Judges and Merit Selection Under the
Missouri Plan,64 WASH. U. L.Q. 903, 904-07 (1986) (exploring the limited success of women
gaining judicial appointments and noting that rather than removing politics from judicial
selection process, the judicial appointment process simply rebalances the political interest of the
bar, bench, political parties, and the governor). Federal judicial appointments during the Clinton
presidency were slowed by efforts "to make the federal bench more conservative," and the
federal appointment system "continues to favor white men significantly and is so dominated by
politics and paybacks that minority nominees are twice as likely to be rejected as whites." Joan
Biskupic, PoliticsSnares Court Hopes ofMinoritiesand Women, USA TODAY, Aug. 22, 2000,
at IA.
50. "The Florida court, cloaked in merit-selected robes, suffered heavy bashing last month
as Republicans, including former presidential candidate Bob Dole, beat the war drums that the
justices had been chosen by 'Democrats."' Rob Modic, Top Justices Hold Summit in Chicago,
DAYTON DAILYNEws, Dec. 9,2000, at lB. "Seven of the [United States Supreme Court] justices
were nominated by Republican presidents, and a ruling in favor of George W. Bush would open
them up for criticism of the type that rained on the Democrat-appointed Florida Supreme Court
when it favored Vice President Al Gore." George E. Condon, Jr., High Court Walks Nonpartisan
Tightrope; ExpertsSay Credibilityof Supreme Court on the Line, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Dec.
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B. The EthicalBehavior and Civility ofJudges
The professionalism movement advocates civility and compliance with
both the spirit and letter of ethical rules as a means for improving lawyers'
behavior. However, the movement neglects these problems among judges, even
though there are numerous instances ofjudges ignoring their ethical obligations
or behaving badly.
Recently, the New Hampshire Supreme Court was in turmoil for several
months because justices recused from cases routinely sat in on deliberations
and reviewed draft opinions in those same cases.' Some of the justices also
were accused of attempting to influence the outcome of cases in which they or
another justice had an interest. 2 In Ohio, law clerks had to break up a fight
between two supreme court justices."3 One of the justices was thrown against
a desk and choked with his tie, causing severe bruising and two fractured ribs. 4
Two years later, one of the same justices was involved in another incident. In
that incident, the justice used a racial epithet, asked a court employee if he had
any "black blood," and then denied making these statements until confronted
with a tape recording. 55
Other instances of injudicious behavior by state court trial judges include
the following: a judge having sex with a woman whose husband was a

12,2000, at A19. "The shot was fired at the heart of the nation by the five conservative justices
of the U.S. Supreme Court, with their politically inspired ruling that installed George W. Bush
a president .... You don't need an inside source to realize that the five conservative justices
were acting as the last in a team of Republican Party elders who helped drag Governor Bush
across the finish line." Thomas L. Friedman, Medal of Honor, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2000, at
A39. In criticizing the Court, Professor Bradley Joondeph, a former law clerk to U.S. Supreme
Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, stated, "Given the weakness in Bush's arguments that
federal law is involved, in my view, it is difficult to understand-aside from pure politics-why
the U.S. Supreme Court has inserted itself into this drama." Bradley Joondeph, Florida
Judges-Not U.S.-Need to Resolve Voting-law Ambiguities, MERCURY NEWS (San Jose) (last
visited Dec. 11, 2000), available at http://www.mercurycenter.com/
opinion/perspective/docs/liberallO.htm.
An apparent partisan divide even exists in some federal circuits as one reporter noted the
absence of all the "Republican-appointed judges" at a ceremony for Abner Mikva, a Democratappointed former chief judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. Jonathan
Groner, PartisanGap at Mikva Ceremony,LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 23, 2000, at 8. Partisanship in the
federal judicial appointment process has gone to "new lengths," and divisions in appellate
opinions are "often along party lines, or close to it." Stuart Taylor Jr., Why It's GettingHarder
to Appoint Judges,31 NAT'L L.J. 2783, 2783-84 (1999).
51. See What RecusalMeans Gets New Attention After NH Case Erupts,N.H. SUNDAY
NEws, Apr. 9, 2000, at A22.
52. See Ralph Ranalli, Trust Cited at Trial of Judge in N.H., Defense Promises New
Evidence, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 19, 2000, at D7.
53. Ken Myers, Rumpus in Columbus as JusticesBattle, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 25, 1991, at 3.
54. Id.
55. Mark Tatage, Wright Protest Planned: Groups Expected to Push for Justice's
Resignation,PLAIN DEALER, Mar. 17, 1993, at 3B.
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defendant in a criminal case the judge was hearing;" a judge commenting on
the physical attributes of women in his courtroom; 7 a judge throwing a glass
of water at a lawyer in court;" a judge calling a defendant "a smart aleck and
yelling, 'Shut up before you go to jail"';59 and a judge explaining to a witness
that she was "on his turf and, in his venue at least, he is God. 60
Federal judges are not immune to charges ofpoor behavior.6 Recently, the
Ninth Circuit Judicial Council issued a public reprimand of a district court
judge for "exchanging offensive notes in court with a clerk."'62 The notes
contained a number of ethnic and racial slurs, and the judicial council
characterized the judge's conduct as "'prejudicial to the effective
administration of the business of the courts." 63
In another recent case, the Fifth Circuit Judicial Council found that a
federal district court judge "engaged in a continuing pattern of conduct
evidencing arbitrariness and abusiveness that has brought disrepute on, and
discord within, the federal judiciary." 64The Judicial Council also found that the
judge's "intemperate, abusive and intimidating treatment of lawyers, fellow
judges, and others ... detrimentally affected the effective administration of
justice . . . [and the judge] abused judicial power, imposed unwarranted
sanctions on lawyers, and repeatedly and unjustifiably attacked individual
lawyers and groups of lawyers and court personnel."6 The Judicial Council
sanctioned the judge by barring the judge from receiving new case assignments
for a period of one year, disqualifying the judge from cases involving certain
attorneys for a period of three years, and issuing a public reprimand. 6 Rather
than accept the sanctions, the judge is challenging the constitutionality of the
Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980,67 which is the only authority for

56. Josh Meyer, Obscure Mail FraudStatute Brought Ex-Judge Down, L.A. TIMES, Sept.
15, 2000, at BI.
57. Gail Diane Cox, How Could They Do It? Racial Cracks,Naked PicturesHead Year's
List ofJudicialLows, NAT'L L.J., May 1, 2000, at Al, A6.
58. Pamela Coyle, Benchstress: When PressuresBuild Up in the Courtroom,Judges Can
Erupt, 81 A.B.A. J., Dec. 1995, at 60, 60.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. "According to national court statistics, of 2,259 complaints filed against federal judges
from 1996 to 1998, three resulted in a finding against a judge." Karen Dom Steele, U.S. Judge
Reprimandedfor Notes, THE SPOKESMAN-REVIEW, Sept. 12, 2000, at Al, A4.
62. Id. atAl.
63. Id.
64. McBryde v. Comm. to Review Circuit Council Conduct & Disability Orders of the
Judicial Conf. of the United States, 83 F. Supp. 2d 135, 148 (D.D.C. 1999) (challenging the
constitutionality of the Fifth Circuit Judicial Council's actions in this case).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 139.
67. 28 U.S.C.S. § 372(c) (1988). The Act authorizes the Judicial Council in each circuit
to impose the following sanctions: certifying the disability of a judge, ordering that on a
temporary basis no further cases will be assigned to the judge, censuring or reprimanding the
judge by a private communication or public communication, but under no circumstances may
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judicial discipline of federal judges short of impeachment by the United States
Congress.6
Judge V. Robert Payant, a former president of the National Judicial
College, calls instances of judges acting badly "black robe fever," and he
acknowledges that this behavior is "undermining the public's already shaky
confidence in the legal system. '69 Some federal judges are concerned about this
behavior as well. A survey by the Seventh Judicial Circuit found that twentytwo percent ofthe respondingjudges believed that there were civility problems
between or among judges.7"
These findings, together with public opinion of the judiciary, political
pressures possibly affecting the integrity of the judiciary, and the uncivil and
unethical behavior of some judges, indicate that it is time to focus on judges'
professionalism.
III. EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE PROFESSIONALISM OF JUDGES
Though the behavior of some judges raises civility and ethical concerns,
few in the professionalism movement have given more than lip service to
judges' professionalism. There are at least three reasons for the relative silence
concerning judicial professionalism. First, bar leaders and other lawyers may
be reluctant to raise concerns over the professionalism of the judiciary either

ajudicial council order the removal of office of any judge appointed to hold office during good
behavior. 28 U.S.C.S. § 372(c)(6)(B)(ii)-(vii).
68. For most of the history of the United States, impeachment of federal judges by
Congress was the only discipline available. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl.
5, art. 1, § 3, cl.
6.
Indeed, during the 1980s, the Senate convicted and removed three federal judges-Judge Harry
E. Claibome, Judge Alcee L. Hastings, and Judge Walter Nixon-for making false statements
under penalty of perjury relating to offenses such as accepting bribes, fixing cases, filing false
tax returns, and committing perjury. See Testimony January11, 1999 TrialMemorandum ofthe
United States House Senate Full Senate Impeachment Trial Day-ll, 105TH CONG. (1999)
(Senate sitting in on impeachment hearings).
In 1939, Congress created the Judicial Councils ofthe Federal Circuits. See Administrative
Office Actof 1939, ch. 501, 53 Stat. 1223 (1939). Whether ornotthe circuitcouncils had powers
to discipline individual judges beyond adjusting case assignments was in doubt. See J. Clifford
Wallace, Must We Have the Nunn Bill? The Alternative ofJudicialCouncils ofthe Circuits, 51
IND.L.J. 297,314-21 (1976). Through the passage of the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of
1980, however, circuit councils have more clearly defined power to punish individual judges.
Yet, in his appeal from the district court decision, see McBryde, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 135, affirming
the discipline of the Judicial Council of the Fifth Circuit, Judge McBryde is challenging the
constitutionality ofthe Act in the Federal Circuit. Jonathan Groner, SparksFly atArgument Over
Judge Discipline,LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 20, 2000, at 8.
69. Coyle, supra note 58, at 60.
70. Forty-five percent of the judges responding believed that there is a problem with
civility, and fifty percent of those believed that there were civility problems between or among
judges. Interim Civility Report of the Seventh Circuit, supra note 6, app. II at 430, tbls.2 & 3.
In this same survey, forty-two percent of the lawyers found civility to be lacking, and the survey
did not ask lawyers' opinions about civility problems between or among judges. Id. app. III at
433, tbl.2.
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because they fear possible reprisals by judges in cases the lawyers bring 1 or
because the lawyers may think that the ethical prohibition against criticizing
individual judges extends to honest opinions about ways to improve the
judiciary.72 Second, judges may be reluctant to raise issues of judicial
professionalism either because they fear disrupting judicial collegiality or
because they fear that it will lead to unfair criticism of the judiciary. 3 Third, the
inattention to the judiciary is based, at least in part, on the history of the
professionalism movement. There is a lack of empirical research to support or
refute the first two reasons,74 but there is evidence to support the third reason
for the lack of focus on judicial professionalism.
A. History ofJudicialProfessionalismInitiatives
The current concern for civility dates back at least to 1971, when former
Chief Justice Warren Burger wrote that "overzealous advocates seem to think
the zeal and effectiveness of a lawyer depends on how thoroughly he can
disrupt the proceedings or how loud he can shout or how close he can come to

71. This statement is based upon anecdotal information and observations from the author's
more than twenty years as a practicing lawyer, activebar association member, and law professor
(who continues to go to court several times a week while supervising law students in clinical
legal education programs). Judges wield enormous power in cases, and lawyers generally
believe that any comment about the need to improvejudicial professionalism will be interpreted
by some judges as unfair criticism. As a result, most lawyers, and almost all bar leaders, are
reluctant to offer suggestions for improving judicial professionalism beyond calls for merit
selection of judges, for judges to police the professionalism of lawyers more closely, or for
judges to become involved in law school programs to educate law students about lawyer
professionalism.
72. Rule 8.2 of the ABA Model Rules of ProfessionalConductprovides, in pertinent part:
(a) A lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be
false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the
qualifications or integrity of a judge, adjudicatory officer or public legal
officer, or of a candidate for election or appointment to judicial or legal
office.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucT R. 8.2 (1999) [hereinafter MODEL RuLEs].
As the plain language of Rule 8.2 indicates, lawyers are only prohibited from making false
or reckless statements concerning particular judges, and they are not prohibited from making
statements that are truthful. In fact, commentary to the rule states that a lawyer's honest
assessment ofjudicial qualifications "contributes to improving the administration ofjustice." Id.
at cmt. 1.
73. This statement is based primarily on anecdotal information and observations from more
than twenty years as a practicing lawyer and law professor and from numerous conversations
with individual judges. The authority structures in most courts provide individual judges with
a great deal of autonomy. Many judges express the belief that there is little they can do to effect
change in the behavior of other judges and that to attempt to do so may actually bring more
disharmony among thejudiciary. Some judges are also fearful that programs aimed at improving
the judiciary may spur unfounded criticism upon the judiciary as an institution.
74. More empirical research into lawyers' opinions ofjudges as well as judges' opinions
of other judges is needed.
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insulting all those he encounters-including the judges."75 Mindful that lack of
civility exists among judges as well as lawyers, Chief Justice Burger noted,
"Every judge must remember that no matter what the provocation, the judicial
response must be [a] judicious response and that no one more surely sets the
tone and the pattern for courtroom conduct than the presider. 7 6 Despite
identifying the need for judges to set the tone for courtroom conduct, Chief
Justice Burger focused his remarks on the need to improve lawyers' civility.77
Chief Justice Burger's narrow focus on lawyers was also present in his
1984 recommendation to the American Bar Association (ABA) to explore the
"decline in professionalism" by focusing on advertising and competition among
lawyers.7" In response, the ABA created the Commission on Professionalism
(known as the Stanley Commission).79 In keeping with Chief Justice Burger's
recommendation, the Stanley Commission surveyed a nonrandom sample of
234 corporate executives and judges about the professionalism of lawyers, not
the professionalism of judges.80
After conducting the survey and exploring the issues, the Stanley
Commission recommended that law schools, the practicing bar, bar
associations, and the judiciary give more attention to ethics and
professionalism.8 ' Yet, the Commission's actual recommendations for judges
were sparse.8 2 The Commission advised judges to take a more active role in
policing lawyer conduct by seeing that "cases advance promptly, fairly and
without abuse" and by "impos[ing] sanctions for abuse of the litigation
process." 83 The Commission also recommended that "members of the judiciary

75. Warren E. Burger, The Necessity of Civility, 52 F.R.D. 211, 213 (1971). However,
concerns over civility can easily be traced to the early part of the twentieth century. In 1906,
Roscoe Pound stated:
The idea that procedure must ofnecessity be wholly contentious disfigures
our judicial administration at every point ....It leads counsel to forget
that they are officers of the court and to deal with the rules of law and
procedure exactly as the professional football coach [deals] with the rules
of the sport.... The effect... is not only to irritate parties, witnesses and
jurors in particular cases, but to give to the whole community a false notion
of the purpose and end of law.... If the law is a mere game, neither the
players who take part in it nor the public who witness it can be expected to
yield to its spirit when their interests are served by evading it.
P.oscoe Pound, The CausesofPopularDissatisfactionwith the AdministrationofJustice, in THE
POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE INTHE FUTURE 337, 344-45 (A. Leo Levin &
Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979).
76. Burger, supra note 75, at 215.
77. Id. at 215-17. Chief Justice Burger also acknowledges that "only a tiny fragment of
reckless, irresponsible lawyers are guilty." Id. at 217.
78. LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRAcTICES, supra note 7, at ix.
79. Id.
80. STANLEY REPORT, supra note 7, at 254 nn.22-24 and accompanying text.
81. Id. at 263-65.
82. See id. at 290-96.
83. Id. at 290-91.
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and the practicing bar must all do far more to report instances of illegal or
unprofessional conduct.., to either the appropriate disciplinary commission
' The only other recommendations involving the
or prosecuting attorney."84
judiciary called for measures requiring broader public or legislative support
such as merit selection ofjudges, more funding for disciplinary agencies under
the control of state high courts, and more funding for state high court control
of the bar admission process.ss
At the ABA's August 1988 meeting-two years after the Stanley
Report-the ABA adopted as policy the "recommendation that state and local
bar associations 'encourage their members to accept as a guide for their
individual conduct, and to comply with, a lawyers' creed of
professionalism."' 86 At the same meeting, the ABA adopted a "Lawyer's Creed
of Professionalism," proposed by the ABA Torts and Insurance Section," and
a "Lawyers' Pledge of Professionalism," proposed by the ABA Young
Lawyers' Section. 8 Both of these documents deal solely with lawyer
professionalism.89 The ABA has neither promulgated a professionalism creed
for judges nor engaged in a campaign to improve the professionalism of the
judiciary, even though the ABA plays an important role in matters of
professionalism and promulgating model standards for judicial conduct.9"
More recently, the Conference of Chief Justices adoptedA NationalAction
9 The Action Plan states that the
Planon Lawyer ConductandProfessionalism.
vast majority of lawyers are competent, conscientious, honest, and civil.92 The
Action Plan states further that "the unprofessional and unethical conduct of a
small, but highly visible, proportion of lawyers taints the image of the entire
legal community and fuels the perception that lawyer professionalism has

84. Id. at 287.
85. See id. at 292-96.
86. Creeds of Professionalism, supra note 5, at 01:401.
87. Id.

88. Id. at 01:403.
89. Id. at 01:401-03.
90. The ABA is a membership association for both lawyers and judges. In the words of the
Chief Justice of the Indiana Supreme Court, "few question [the ABA's] legitimate interest in
matters of professionalism. [The ABA] is a forum in which judges exercise influence well
beyond their numbers." Randall T. Shepard, What Judges Can DoAbout LegalProfessionalism,
72 FLA. BARJ. 30, 34 (1998).
In 1924, the ABA adopted thirty-four Canons of Judicial Ethics. EDSON R. SUNDERLAND,
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND ITS WORK 113-14 (1953). "During the next

50 years, a majority [of state high courts] adopted the Canons either verbatim or in an amended
version." Leslie W. Abramson, Canon 2 ofthe Code ofJudicialConduct, 79 MARQ. L. Rsv. 949,
950 n.1 (1996). The ABA adopted the Model Code of Judicial Conduct in 1990, and again a
majority ofjurisdictions adopted all or part of the Model Code. See id. at 950 nn.1 & 3.
91. A.B.A. CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES, A NATIONAL ACTION PLAN ON LAWYER
CONDUCT AND PROFESSIONALISM (1999), availableat http://ccj.ncsc.dni.us/natlplan.htm (last
visited Jan. 11, 2001) [hereinafter ChiefJustice's Report].

92. Id. at I.
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declined precipitously in recent decades." 93 The Action Plan's "sole
objective ... is to promote professionalism in the legal profession and the
judiciary,"94 and it calls upon judges to lead by example.95 While the Action
Plan promotes the concept of a lawyer professionalism creed, it fails to
consider the need for a professionalism creed for judges, and it does not
thoroughly explore how judges can lead by exemplifying their own
professionalism.
Since the Stanley Report, there have been nearly fifteen years of
introspection over professionalism and a multitude of special professionalism
committees, creeds of professionalism or codes of civility, organizations, and
prizes aimed at improving professionalism.96 After all of this activity, there are
just a few examples of efforts to improve judges' professionalism.
B. CurrentJudicialProfessionalismInitiatives
The work of the Committee on Civility of the Seventh Judicial Circuit is
a notable exception to the historical inattention to the professionalism of the
judiciary.97 The Committee was the first group to examine judicial conduct as
well as lawyer conduct, and the Committee defined civility as "professional
conduct in litigation proceedings of judicialpersonnel and attorneys."" In
1989, the Committee conducted an informal survey of over 1500 lawyers and
judges in the Seventh Judicial Circuit.99 According to the Committee's chair,
Federal District Court Judge Marvin Aspen, the Seventh Circuit's survey may
be "the first to venture into the problem ofjudicial incivility."'" ° In the survey,
many lawyers said that "judges are sarcastic, arrogant, rude, lack respect for
lawyers, lack judicial temperament and needlessly humiliate lawyers in
01
court.'

93. Id.
94. Id. at 3.
95. See id. at 4.
96. The Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough Center on Professionalism at the University
of South Carolina School of Law has produced a Directory ofProfessionalismInitiatives that
contains information on national professionalism activities, state level commissions on
professionalism, law school professionalism or ethics centers, award winning professionalism
programs, and other professionalism activities. See ProfessionalismInitiatives,52 S.C. L. REV.
747 (2001) (providing a condensed version of theDirectory,which is on file in its full form with
the South Carolina Law Review). See also Joy, supra note 3, at 988-89 (listing several
professionalism activities).
97. See generallyInterim Civility Report of the Seventh Circuit, supra note 6 (including
judges in its survey on civility and professionalism); Final Civility Report of the Seventh Circuit,
supra note 6 (reporting final comments about perceived incivility in the profession).
98. Interim Civility Report of the Seventh Circuit, supra note 6, at 378 n.1 (emphasis
added).
99. Id. at 377-79, at 426 app. I.
100. Aspen, supra note 1,at 515.
101. Interim Civility Report of the Seventh Circuit, supra note 6, at 401.
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In responding to these and other complaints about judges, Judge Aspen
stated:
Judges must, by example and by comments in written
opinions, set the proper tone of civility in the courtroom. One
has only to peruse the pages of current volumes of reported
cases to come upon vitriolic and demeaning condemnations
by the score of a court, judicial colleagues' opinions, or
attomeys."°
In discussing incivility among lawyers, Judge Aspen notes that judges "bear
considerable responsibility" not to "tolerate lawyer incivility," and a failure to
address such conduct "sends the wrong signal to the bar, and puts the ethical
advocate in a posture where he or she may, unfortunately, conclude that the
only recourse left to an opponent's 'Rambo' tactics is to 'fight fire with
fire."" 3 Judge Aspen argues that judges must set a good example
in written
4
courtroom."'
the
in
civility
of
tone
proper
the
"set
and
opinions
In keeping with this sentiment, the Committee proposed standards for
professional conduct that covered judges as well as lawyers, and these
standards were adopted by the Seventh Circuit.'0 5 With respect to judicial
conduct, the Preamble for the Standards for Professional Conduct for the
Seventh Circuit provides: "A judge's conduct should be characterized at all
times by courtesy and patience toward all participants. As judges we owe to all
participants in a legal proceeding respect, diligence,° punctuality, andprotection
against unjust and improper criticism or attack."'
The Seventh Circuit Standards outline thirty duties lawyers owe to other
counsel"° and eight duties lawyers owe to the court.10 The Standards conclude
by outlining the twelve duties judges owe to lawyers, parties, and witnesses.'0 9
These include obligations to "be courteous, respectful, and civil," to "not
employ hostile, demeaning, or humiliating words in opinions or in written or

102. Aspen, supra note 1, at 519.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Standardsfor Professional Conduct within the Seventh FederalJudicial Circuit,
USCS Cr. R., app. at 186 (Lexis 2000).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 187-89. These duties include matters of civility, such as treating other counsel,
parties, and witnesses in a "civil and courteous manner," as well as various pledges such as
promises to use stipulations for matters not in dispute, to consult with opposing counsel when
scheduling matters, and not to use discovery or other legal processes for purposes of delay or "as
a means of harassment." Id.
108. Id. at 189. These duties require lawyers to "speak and write civilly and respectfully,"
"be punctual," "not knowingly misrepresent, mischaracterize, misquote, or miscite facts or
authorities," and "act and speak civilly" to clerks, secretaries, bailiffs, and other courtpersonnel.
109. Id. at 190.
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oral communications," to "be punctual in convening all hearings, meetings, and
conferences," to "be considerate of time schedules" of others, to "allow lawyers
to present proper arguments and to make a complete and accurate record," to
"make all reasonable efforts to decide promptly all matters presented," and to
' 10
"give the issues in controversy deliberate, impartial, and studied analysis."
In language that tracks the Standards of Conduct for the Seventh Federal
Judicial Circuit, the Tenth Judicial Circuit of Alabama adopted Standards of
Professional Conduct that require the same twelve standards for judges'
conduct."' In addition, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has adopted Standards
of Professional Responsibility, Courtesy and Decorum for the Courts of the
State of Wisconsin.1 2 The standards are not enforceable by disciplinary boards,
but they do establish requirements of civility for judges and other court
personnel as well as lawyers.13 Finally, Ohio is considering adopting a separate
"Judicial Creed."' 4 The proposed creed is short and simply reaffirms the
judge's oath of office, ethical obligations, and commitment to fairness.",5
Like many lawyers' creeds, Ohio's proposed judicial creed is vague and
aspirational. Similarly, the judicial professionalism efforts of the Seventh
Federal Judicial Circuit, the Tenth Judicial Circuit of Alabama, and the
110. Id. The other duties judges owe include the following: to refrain from "impugn[ing]
the integrity or professionalism of any lawyer on the basis of the clients whom or the causes
which a lawyer represents," to do their "best to insure that court personnel act civilly toward
lawyers, parties, and witnesses," "not [to] adopt procedures that needlessly increase litigation
expense," and to "bring to lawyers' attention uncivil conduct which we observe." Id.
111. Tenth Judicial Circuit of Alabama General Order Standardsfor Professional
Conduct, availableat http://birmingham.org/PDF/Standards.pdf (last visited Dec. 2, 2000).
112. The StandardsofProfessionalResponsibility, Courtesyand Decorumfor the Courts
of the State of Wisconsin, availableat http://www.wisbar.org/rules/scr62.html (last visited Dec.
2, 2000).
113. See id.§ 62.01.
114. Press Release, Ohio Supreme Court, Supreme Court Considers Judicial Creed (June
6, 2000) (on file with author).
115. The proposed Ohio Judicial Creed states as follows:
Judicial Creed
For the purpose of publicly stating my beliefs, convictions, and aspirations
as a member of the Judiciary of the State of Ohio:
I re-affirm my oath of office and acknowledge my obligations under the
Canons of Judicial Ethics.
I recognize the role of ajudge as a guardian ofour system ofjurisprudence
dedicated to equal justice under law for all persons.
I believe that the role of ajudge requires scholarship, diligence, personal
integrity, and dedication to the attainment ofjustice.
I know that a judge must not only be fair but also give the appearance of
being fair.
I will treat all persons, including litigants, lawyers, witnesses, jurors,
judicial colleagues, and court staffwith dignity and courtesy and will insist
that others do likewise.
I will aspire every day to make the Court I serve a model of justice and
truth.
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Wisconsin Supreme Court are largely aspirational. Nevertheless, all of these
efforts recognize that judges as well as lawyers have professionalism
responsibilities.
IV.

PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING PROFESSIONALISM

BY IMPROVING THE

PROFESSIONALISM OF THE JUDICIARY

Although there are many reasons for the inattention to judicial
professionalism, there is no reason to continue to exclude concerns over judges'
conduct from the professionalism movement. If bar associations and judges
believe that professionalism creeds are good for lawyers, then they should
implement professionalism creeds for judges.
The Stanley Commission noted that its primary concern was the public's
view of the legal profession and stated that all segments of the Bar should
"[p]reserve and develop within the profession integrity, competence, fairness,
independence, courage and a devotion to the public interest."'" 6 In keeping with
the Commission's goals, the ABA Lawyer's Creed includes a pledge for
lawyers to "strive to make our system ofjustice work fairly and efficiently."' 17
Yet the fair and efficient administration of justice is equally, if not primarily,
the duty of judges, and the ABA has not enacted an ABA Judge's Creed.
The ABA Lawyer's Creed also contains promises to treat all parties,
lawyers, and court personnel with respect; to maintain competency in the areas
of practice; to report ethics violations of fellow lawyers; to protect the public
image of the legal profession; and to contribute to the public good." 8 The
Seventh Judicial Circuit and a few other courts' efforts to establish standards
of conduct for judges indicate that each of these pledges or promises is equally
applicable to judges." 9
While professionalism creeds or civility standards for judges may be a first
step, they are not enough for the judiciary to lead the professionalism
movement by example. Judicial conferences and state supreme court justices
must explore concrete steps to improve legal professionalism, starting with
measures to improve judicial professionalism. These measures should include
consideration of the following recommendations to monitor judges'
professionalism and to establish better recusal standards.2 Better monitoring

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

STANLEY REPORT, supra note 7, at 265.
Creeds of Professionalism, supranote 5, at 01:401.
Id. at 01:401-03.
See supra notes 97-115 and accompanying text.
These two recommendations do not address all of the issues important to improving

judicial professionalism. Rather, these are concrete examples of what the judiciary should be
doing to lead by example. I hope that judges, bar associations, and other commentators will

explore some ofthe otherjudicial professionalism issues such as the need to enforce prohibitions
against ex parte communications, the effect of politics on judicial appointments, the need for
judges to be more sensitive to issues of race and gender, and the need to ban state and federal
judges from attending all-expense paid educational seminars funded by "private interests bent
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ofjudges' performances would address both the civility and ethics dimensions
of the professionalism movement, and better recusal standards would
demonstrate a commitment to meaningful ethical rules. Both recommendations
should also improve public confidence in, and respect for, judges and the legal
profession.
A. MonitorJudges 'Records on Professionalism
State high courts and federal judicial conferences need to do a better job
of monitoring the professionalism ofjudges. Because judges often act publicly
in either hearing cases or listening to appellate arguments, they can be
evaluated by those with whom they come in contact. Performance evaluations
are widely used in public and private employment, but very few state supreme
courts, and none of the federal judicial conferences, have meaningful
evaluations ofjudicial performance. As of 1995, only the Navajo Nation and
ten states had performance reviews ofjudgesY'
Those states with judicial performance reviews usually focus on trial
judges, and their reviews are based on surveys completed by lawyers and, in
some instances, appellate judges, police officers, and probation officers." Such
surveys usually contain questions regarding ajudge's legal ability, management
skills, and demeanor.123 Typically, the surveys are filled out after court
appearances. In addition to questions about legal ability, the surveys ask if the
judge was fair and impartial, considerate and courteous to participants,

on influencing their future decisions." A Threat to JudicialEthics, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15,2000,
at A34 (advocating reform of the practices by private interests such as providing "free vacations
at posh resorts" to judges attending legal seminars that promote a "free-market approach to
matters like protecting the environment," and criticizing Chief Justice William Rehnquist's
support for lifting a ban on federal judges collecting honorariums for appearances). See also
DOUG KENDALL, NOTHING FOR FREE: How PRIVATE JUDICIAL SEMINARS ARE UNDERMINING
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTIONS AND BREAKING THE PUBLIC'S TRUST 1-2 (Community Rights
Counsel 2000) (discussing whether "private corporations and special interests [should] be
permitted to fund, and thus shape, the continuing legal education of our nation's judges").
121. A. John PelanderJudicial
PerformanceReview in Arizona: Goals,PracticalEffects
and Concerns,30 ARIZ. ST.L.J. 643,645-46 n.6 (1998). The ten states withjudicial performance
review programs by 1995 include the following: Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut,
Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and Utah. Id. Other states were
exploring judicial performance review programs in 1995, and it is likely that review programs
are now in place in more than ten states. Id. at 646 n.6. For example, the New Mexico Supreme
Court established a statewide judicial performance evaluation program in 1997. NM. Judicial
Performance,ALBUQUERQUE J., Sept. 19, 1998, at A5.In 1985 the ABA House of Delegates
approved guidelines for the evaluation ofjudges. RICHARDH.KuH, ForewordtoSPECIAL COMM.
ON EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE, AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION GUIDELINES FOR
EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE (1985) [hereinafter ABA GUIDELINES FOR JUDICIAL
PERFORMANCE].

122. Pelander, supra note 121, at 652-54.
123. See ABA GUIDELINES FOR JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE, supra note 121, at 36 app. B-I
(Conn. Lawyer's Questionnaire), 51-55 app. B-3 (N.J. Lawyer's Questionnaire).
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arrogant, unduly impatient, or biased against participants according to race,
ethnicity, gender, religion, or other reasons. 24 The surveys also ask if the judge
was punctual, took unnecessary recesses, adjourned too early, encroached on
the proper function of the lawyers or jury, and acted reasonably promptly and
decisively. 1
Judicial performance surveys are often used by committees or commissions
making recommendations for judicial retention election purposes, by entities
and individuals designing judicial education programs, and by individual
judges seeking to improve their judicial skills.'26 All of these purposes are
important to improving the professionalism of the judiciary. State high courts
and federal judicial conferences that do not currently have judicial review
programs in place should implement them pursuant to their inherent authority
to regulate the administration of justice and judges' conduct. Judicial review
programs should also include appellate judges and supreme court justices. In
addition, high courts and judicial conferences should monitor judges' records
in reporting ethical misconduct of other lawyers and judges. 27

124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See Pelander, supra note 121, at 646 n.6 (noting that as of 1998, only Alaska,
Arizona, Colorado, Hawaii, and Utah use judicial performance reviews for retention election
purposes).
127. Canon 3D of the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct provides:
D. Disciplinary Responsibilities
(1) A judge who receives information indicating a substantial
likelihood that anotherjudge has committed a violation of this Code should
take appropriate action. A judge having knowledge that anotherjudge has
committed a violation of this Code that raises a substantial question as to
the other judge's fitness for office shall inform the appropriate authority.
(2) A judge who receives information indicating a substantial
likelihood that a lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct ...should take appropriate action. A judge having
knowledge that a lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct ... that raises a substantial question as to the
lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects
shall inform the appropriate authority.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3D(1), (2) (1999).
However, Professor Leslie Abramson is critical of the language of the ABA Code of
Judicial Conduct and ofstate versions that track the ABAjudicial reporting language. See Leslie
W. Abramson, The Judge'sEthicalDuty to Report Misconduct by Other Judges and Lawyers
and Its Effect on JudicialIndependence, 25 HOFSTRA L. REv. 751 (1997). Abramson states that
"the standards are unclear in their language and judges are frequently unsure or unwilling to
apply them." Id. at 783. She argues that "special efforts must be made to clarify those standards
in order to preserve both the integrity ofthe legal system and the reporting judge's independence
in meting out appropriate sanctions." Id. Abramson recommends that the language of Canon 3
should be modified to read:
(1) A judge who receives credible information that another judge either is
no longer fit to continue in office or has committed a violation of the Code
shall inform the appropriate authority.
(2) A judge who receives credible information that a lawyer either is no
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Based on the results of the surveys and other monitoring, state high courts
and judicial conferences should provide feedback to each judge at least yearly.
High courts and judicial conferences should then recognize exemplary judges
with some type of award, and judges with significantly low scores should be
placed in a mentor or peer counseling program.'
B. EstablishBetter Recusal Standards
Every state and the District of Columbia has a code of ethics governing
judges' behavior. Forty-nine states and the District of Columbia base their
judicial ethics codes to varying degrees on the ABA Model Code of Judicial
Conduct,29 and Montana has a code of judicial conduct that "bear[s] some
degree of similarity to the Model Codes."'30 Despite the pervasiveness of
judicial ethics codes, there is still a serious need to remove the appearance of
undue influence by campaign contributors on elected judges.'
Canon 3E of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct provides that "[a] judge
shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's
impartiality might reasonably be questioned."'3 Additionally, existing canons
of judicial ethics require judges to avoid "impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety,"' 33 and to perform all of their judicial duties "impartially and

longer fit to practice law or has committed a violation of the applicable
rules of professional conduct shall inform the appropriate authority. The
judge's obligation to inform does not preclude the judge from handling a
lawyer's misconductby taking additional disciplinary measures against the
lawyer.
Id. at 780.
I agree with Abramson. I also believe that monitoring judges in terms of their disciplinary
responsibility to report misconduct will encourage the timely reporting of unethical conduct by
other judges and lawyers.
128. Responding to a request from the Florida Supreme Court for a proposal to address
issues of professionalism among Florida state court judges, Professor Lawrence Krieger
recommended a system of attorney evaluations of judges with feedback and some form of
recognition for exemplary judges. Letter from Professor Lawrence Krieger to the Florida
Supreme Court (Sept. 7, 1999) (on file with author).
129. MODELCODEOFJUDICIALCONDUCT, supranote127. The followingjurisdictions have
judicial codes of ethics based on the Model Code: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West
Virginia, and Wyoming. JEFFREY M. SHAMAN ETAL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHIcs § 1.02, at
3-5 (3d ed. 2000).
130. SHAMAN, supra note 129, § 1.02, at 5.
131. See supraPart I.A.
132. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 127, Canon 3E.
133. Id. at Canon 2 ("Ajudge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety
in all of the judge's activities.").
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diligently."' 34 These canons indicate that unlike private lawyers who owe a

duty to their clients, judges hold an office of public trust and owe duties to the
public to be independent, fair, and above reproach.
There are no records of how many judges have voluntarily disqualified
themselves from cases involving campaign contributors or supporters.' 3s Judges
are not always required to explain on the record why they disqualify
themselves, and most campaign contribution cases are never reported. 36 The
public is aware, however, of celebrated cases in which judges have not recused
themselves from hearing matters involving substantial campaign
contributors. 37 As a result, the public believes campaign contributors influence
elected judges'
decisions, and this is eroding the public's faith in the legal
38
system.
The need to ensure the independence and impartiality of elected judges led
the ABA to appoint an Ad Hoc Committee on Judicial Campaign Finance to
recommend new, specific rules for disqualification of judges presiding over
cases involving major contributors to their campaigns. 13 The new ABA
disqualification rules require ajudge's recusal in every proceeding in which the
judge's impartiality may be reasonably questioned, specifically including
instances when a party or a party's lawyer has contributed a threshold amount
to the judge's campaign."4 The new disqualification provision in Canon 3E(1)

134. Id. at Canon 3 ("A judge shall perform the duties ofjudicial office impartially and
diligently.").
135. See PATRICK M. McFADDEN, ELECTING JUSTICE: THE LAW AND ETHICS OF JUDICIAL
ELECTION CAMPAIGNS 19 (1990).

136. See

LESLIE W. ABRAMSON, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION UNDER CANON 3C OF THE

CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 44-46 (1986) (discussing the application of Canon 3C and the

disqualification or recusal ofjudges). Canon 3E in the current version of the Model Code is the
successor to Canon 3C in the original version of the Model Code. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT, supra note 127, app. B (correlation table between the 1972 and 1990 codes).
137. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text (discussing some instances where
judges have refused to recuse themselves and where appellate courts have not disqualified the
judges in cases involving substantial campaign contributors to the judges).
138. See supra notes 12-27 and accompanying text.
139. See A.B.A. AD Hoc COMM. ON JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE, REPORT TO THE HOUSE
OF DELEGATES (May 5,1999), availableathttp://www.abanet.org/cpr/adhoc599.html (last visited
Dec. 10, 2000) [hereinafter AD Hoc COMMITTEE REPORT]. The Ad Hoc Committee was created

in 1998 to review recommendations of the Task Force on Lawyer's Political Contributions
concerning contributions to judges' election campaigns. Id. The Task Force investigated both
"pay to play" contributions-lawyers' campaign contributions to obtain legal work from
government entities-and the effect of contributions in judicial elections. See id.
140. Canon 3E, as amended in 1999, provides:
(1) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the
judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not
limited to instances where:
(e) the judge knows or learns by means ofa timely motion that a party
or a party's lawyer has within the previous [ ]year[s] made aggregate
contributions to the judge's campaign in an amount that is greater
than [[ [S ] for an individual or [$]for an entity] ]] [[is reasonable
and appropriate for an individual or an entity]].
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does not set specific dollar limits, but "leaves that issue up to individual
jurisdictions, recognizing that jurisdictions vary with respect to the cost of
judicial campaigns, the size of the electorate, the availability of alternative
sources such as public funding, and other factors."''
The new recusal provisions were cosponsored by several ABA
committees 4 2 and adopted by the ABA House of Delegates in August 1999. "41
Although it was critical of some aspects of the ABA Task Force's work, the
Committee on Professionalism and Competence of the Bar of the Conference
of Chief Justices commended the ABA's efforts.'" In the Conference of Chief
Justices' response to the ABA Task Force report, the Chief Justices stated that
they supported recusal of judges in "jurisdictions where judicial candidates
have knowledge of the identity of campaign contributors and the amounts of
their contributions, and only to the extent that it applies to lawyers or parties
who donate more to a judicial campaign than the amount permitted by law,
whether established by statute or court rule."' 4 Yet, none of the state high
courts have exercised their inherent authority to regulate judicial conduct by
implementing new ethical rules requiring judges' recusal in cases involving
their substantial campaign contributors.
The comments to Canon 2A of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct
prohibiting impropriety or the appearance of impropriety state that "[t]he test
for appearance of impropriety is whether the conduct would create in
reasonable minds a perception that the judge's ability to carry out judicial

MODEL CODE OF JUDICiAL CONDUCT, supra note 127, at Canon 3E(l)(e). A note to this section
states that:
This provision is meant to be applicable wherever judges are subject to
public election. Jurisdictions that adopt specific dollar limits on
contributions in section 5C(3) should adopt the same limits in section
3E(l)(e). Wherespecific dollar amounts determined by local circumstances
are not used, the "reasonable and appropriate" language should be used.
Id. Canon 3E(l)(e) n.4. Further, the code defines "aggregate" for the purpose of this section to
mean:
[n]ot only contributions in cash or in kind made directly to a candidate's
committee or treasurer, but also, except in retention elections, all
contributions made indirectly with the understanding that they will be used
to support the election of the candidate or to oppose the election of the
candidate's opponent.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 127, Terminology.

141. Conference Report: ABA Annual Meeting, 15 LAWS. MAN. ON PROF. CONDUCT
(ABA/BNA) 396, 399 (1999) [hereinafter Conference Report].
142. In addition to the Ad Hoe Committee on Judicial Campaign Finance, the other cosponsors of the new ethics rules were the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, the ABA Judicial Division, and the ABA Special Committee on Judicial
Independence. See AD Hoc COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 139.
143. See Conference Report, supra note 141, at 399.
144. See CONFERENCE OF CHIEFJUSTICES, RESOLUTION XIV (adopted on Jan. 21, 1999) (on

file with author).
145. Response of the Conference of Chief Justices to the Report and Recommendations
of the ABA Task Force on Lawyers' Political Contributions-Part 11, Recommendations (1999)
(on file with author).
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responsibilities with integrity, impartiality and competence is impaired."'
Although public opinion polls are not the equivalent ofthe "reasonable minds"
test for impropriety, public opinion does demonstrate the perception that
elected judges' decisions are improperly influenced by campaign
contributions.' 47By adopting and enforcing better recusal standards, high courts
can take a positive step toward improving the image of the elected judges by
fully embracing the spirit of ethical rules prohibiting the appearance of
impropriety and guaranteeing fairness and impartiality. If state supreme courts
do not act, the public will continue to question the fairness and impartiality of
elected judges who preside over cases involving their campaign contributors.
V. CONCLUSION

Judges have been, and continue to be, in the forefront of the lawyer
professionalism movement. To date, much of their leadership has been in the
form ofrhetoric and hortatory pronouncements leveled at lawyers and not at the
judiciary. For professionalism to improve in the foreseeable future, there must
be a frank appraisal of how the judiciary can improve itself.Judges set the tone
for lawyers' conduct during litigation, and judges serve as role models for the
legal profession. State high courts also adopt ethics rules and oversee the
enforcement of those rules for both lawyers and judges. Judges are central to
the American concept of justice; society at large, as well as parties before the
court, lawyers, and court personnel, have the right to expect judges to be
independent, fair, and competent.'4 8
A professionalism creed for judges is a starting point, but the judiciary
must do more. The judiciary should examine ways to improve itself, and this
Article offers two concrete proposals: judicial review programs that monitor
the professionalism of judges at both the trial and appellate level, and better
recusal mechanisms in states which elect judges. By implementing these and
other meaningful policies to improvejudicial professionalism, the judiciary will
begin to lead the legal profession by example and not by mere words.

146. See MODEL CODE OF JUDIcIAL CONDucT, supra note 127, Canon 2A cmt.
147. See supra notes 12-27 and accompanying text.
148. The introductory paragraph of the Preamble to the ABA Model Code of Judicial
Conduct states:
Our legal system is based on the principle that an independent, fair and
competent judiciary will interpret and apply the laws that govern us. The
role of the judiciary is central to American concepts ofjustice and the rule
of law. Intrinsic to all sections of this Code are the precepts that judges,
individually and collectively, must respect and honor the judicial office as
a public trust and strive to enhance and maintain confidence in our legal
system. The judge is an arbiter of facts and law for the resolution of
disputes and a highly visible symbol of government under rule of law.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDucT, supra note 127, Preamble.
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